[ad_1]
Kids created by these wallets are usually not hardened
They’re m/44'|49'|84'/0'/0' for trezor one/T and m/49'|84'/0'/0' for ledger X/S. All subsequent kids aren’t hardened.
If an xpub is leaked for a mnemonic phrase + passphrase, in case you have
any of the kids’s non-public keys, you’ll be able to compromise the complete
pockets linked to the xpub and all different kids, hardened or
non-hardened BUT the attacker won’t be able to compromise every other
meomonic phrase + paassphrase you have got because it has a unique xpub, and
in the end totally different kids
That is the reason from bip32: “information of a dad or mum prolonged public key plus any non-hardened non-public key descending from it’s equal to realizing the dad or mum prolonged non-public key (and thus each non-public and public key descending from it). Which means prolonged public keys have to be handled extra rigorously than common public keys.”
I need to know the way it’s even attainable to leak a childs non-public key on
a trezor or a ledger as not one of the outputs are in a position to leak these
Personal keys ought to by no means depart {hardware} wallets with none extraordinary trigger. Normally, solely the grasp seed is transferable as a risk from a {hardware} pockets gadget. And there are usually not many causes to take action. If an attacker is ready to backdoor your gadget and steal keys, the actual fact of sharing xpubs could be irrelevant.
[ad_2]
Supply hyperlink
